Bias Crimes and the First Amendment

Josh Varon

Bias Crimes are both different from and more
severe than their «parallel crimes" 1 or the 'same' crime
without the bias motivation (e.g., defacing a wall with
anti-semitic graffitti vs. defacing it without the
antisemitism). For these reasons, I argue that Bias Crimes
are a unique crime category requiring a unique assessment
of punishment.

Ultimately, I think this assessment will

mean punishing Bias Crimes more severely.
The difference between Bias Crimes and their
respective parallel crimes is based on the criteria for
selecting victims. In Bias Crimes:
a) victims are interchangeable so long as they
share one characteristic in common;
b) the victim and the perpetrator have little or no
previous relationship.
That victims share one common characteristic
distinguishes Bias Crimes from all crimes motivated by
necessity or the requirements of the crime. Bias Crimes
differ from random muggings, most robberies, and most
burglarie . In these crimes, the victim could be
absolutely anyone - motivation for the crime is not
contingent upon the personal identity of the victim. In a
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Bias Crime, however, victim selection depends on the
victim's possession of specific identifying characteristics.
These characteristics categorize a person as a member of a
group; therefore, the Bias Crime threatens that entire
group.
Bias Crimes also differ from crimes where a
relationship exists between perpetrator and victim. In
these, the crime is committed because of the personal
identity of the victim. In a Bias Crime the victim need
not have a relationship with the perpetrator. What counts
is the victim's membership in a hated group.
Bias Crimes also differ from other crimes because
of the threatening message sent to victims in the
commission of the crime.

The threatening message sent

in Bias Crimes causes relatively greater harm to the
immediate victim than the 'parallel crime' alone, and it
also threatens other members of the group to which the
victim belongs because of which the victim is selected in
the first place. Because of the way biased motivation
affects a crime, a victim experiences substantially more
harm than otherwise.
Although the difference and increased severity of
Bias Crimes suggest that they do indeed warrant
increased punishment, the biggest obstacle in punishing

1
Lawrence' t rm for the identical rime lacking biased
motivation- .g. a sauJt and biased motivated as ault.
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Bias Crimes lies in the constitutional permissibility of
punishing Bias Crimes differently. The notion of
punishing Bias Crimes differently, on the surface, appears
to conflict with constraints in the First Amendment on
punishing thoughts or ideas. Frederick Lawrence, author
of the recently published book Punishing Hate: Bias
Crimes Under American Law, provides an resolving this
'paradox' but I do not agree that his theory effectively
resolws it. Instead, I believe that we can employ the
notion of illocutionaryforce derived from speech-act
theory to locate what is punishable in the bias of Bias
Crimes and ultimately, to construct a more convincing
theory that remains constitutionally sound and consistent
with claims about increased severity.
To show this, I will first explain the paradoxical
First Amendment objection. Then I will show both how
Lawrence's theory attempts to avoid the paradox while
still providing a justification for punishing Bias Crimes
more severely; here I examine the deficiencies of his
theory. I will conclude with an examination of the
illocutionary force of the message sent in a Bias Crime to
show how it provides a basis for enhanced penalties for
Bias Crimes.
As I stated earlier, the main obstacle to punishing
Bias Crimes with increased severity is the First
Amendment protection of speech and expression.
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Lawrence calls this problem the Bias Crime-Hate Speech
paradox.

2

Essentially, the paradox is this: how is it

possible to punish a bias criminal while protecting his
right to free expression? The right to free expression
ensures that all beliefs, regardless of their unpopularity or
offensivenes, are guaranteed protection.
The First Amendment intended to protect the
expression of all ideas even those found unappealing by
the majority of citizens. 3 The importance of Freedom of
Expression is twofold: on one hand, by providing a
forum for all ideas, we ensure that the minority's voice
will never be completely overpowered by the majority's.
Thus society can profit even from unpopular ideas when
their time has come, as we saw in the case of the Civil
Rights movement where the majority gained from the
minority who were free to express their discontent.

The

First Amendment also ensures individuals the freedom to
express radical ideas, religious or political opinions,
within the scope of the law.
Punishing Bias Crimes appears to violate the First
Amendment for a number of reasons. First, while it
2
Lawrenc , Frederi k, M. Punishing Hate: Bia Crimes Under
American Law, Pg. 84-85 0999).
3 By expre
ion, the Fir t Am ndm nt provides not ju t the right to
hold c rtain id as or opinion but to ommunicat them a well.
Thu , when rd rring to expr
ion, I will be ref rring to an actionthe act of xprcs ing or communicating. Fr e pee h on the oth r
hand, simply refer to the right to hold any opinion or id a. Th
probl m with punishing Bias Crim conflict with Fr <lorn of
Expres ion, not th Fr dom of Sp e h.
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seems permissible to punish the harm caused by a crime,
it is not permissible

to

punish the criminal's expression of

ideas or opinions about the crime or about the victim.

An anti-gay bigot, for instance, has a constitutionally
protected right to utter venom about gay people; the
exercise of this expression is not punishable by law.
Enhancing punishment for bias seems precisely

to

do this!

Furthermore, the motivation of a crime sends a
message so that, for example, illegally parking in a
handicapped space suggests that one values one's own
convenience over the rights and needs of handicapped
people. However, the law cannot make judgments about
whether one type of motivation is better or worse than
another, e.g. judging that impatience is better or worse
than prejudice. Crimes are punished for the harm they
cause - parking violators and Bias Criminals are
constitutionally permitted to express any idea about their
crime. To base severity of punishment on the thoughts
or motivation of the criminal violates the norm of
content-neutrality.
Content neutrality forbids legislative preference
for the content of one belief over the content of another.
Thus, Bias Crimes cannot be punished simply because
lawmakers do not care for the content of prejudiced
ideas. This ensures that lawmakers cannot create laws
that favor one group over another. In the eyes of the law
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biased, racist, or prejudiced beliefs are not worse or better
than any other beliefs. According to the Bias CrimeHate speech paradox, there is in the eyes of the law
essentially no difference between Bias Crimes and similar
crimes not motivated by bias.
The Bias Crime-Hate speech paradox has stirred
up a good deal of controversy and there are attempts to
avoid the First Amendment conflict. The common
thread through all of them is to leave motivation aside
and punish only the increase in harmful effects. Susan
Gellman is one of the pioneers of this theory and explains
it in her essay: Brother, You Can't Go to Jail For What
You're Thinking: Motives, Effects, and (Hate-Crime'
Laws." 4 In this essay, Gellman argues against the ADL
model legislation for punishment of hate-crimes because
it attempts to punish motivation and mentions nothing
of the effects - essentially, it falls into the trap of the
paradox. To avoid the paradox, Gellman suggests
punishing the additional harm caused by Bias Crimes
rather than any biased motivation.

If after harm

assessment occurs, a crime appears to have a profound
effect on its victim or victims, the crime can be
considered worse.

1
Gellman , Susan , «Brother , You Can 't Go to Jail for What You're
Thinking: Motiv , Effect , and Ilat Crime Law " Criminal
Ju tice Ethic•, vl 1 n 2 umm er 1992.
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Gellman' s idea about punishing the increased
harm is not enough to avoid the paradox although it does
take steps in the right direction. To avoid the paradox,
some relationship between the biased motivation and the
increased severity of the crime has to be drawn which,
however, does not punish the content of the thought or
the expression of ideas.
Lawrence takes Gellman' s suggestion into
consideration and proposes a "two-tiered" theory.
According to this theory, one must distinguish between
Bias Crimes and parallel crimes. All Bias Crimes,
according to Lawrence, contain a parallel crime that is
already punishable regardless of motivation. Bias Crimes
contain this 'tier' (or 'parallel crime') and in addition,
they involve a criminal act of bias (the 2 nd 'tier').
According to Lawrence's theory, a bias criminal
does not have to be a racist, anti-Semite, or bigot in any
way to commit a bias crime (as defined in section 1)5the content of their prejudice is not criminal. What is
punishable, rather, is the harmful consequences of the
unnecessary singling-out of victims.
To be guilty of a Bias Crime under Lawrence's
two-tiered theory first, an offender must be blameworthy
for any parallel crime. Second, when it has been
established that bias motivated the crime, the crime

5

Ibid. , Lawrenc , pg. 95.
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becomes a Bias Crime and can be shown to cause
significantly more harm. The mere expression of Bias
Speech is not illegal, it only meets the second tier of
criteria - without the first tier, a criminal act has not
occurred. By connecting the singling out of victims and
groups with the increase in degree of harm, Lawrence
derives the conclusion that Bias Crimes involve increased
harm.
Lawrence cites examples where law already
takes motive into consideration to increase the degree of
punishment.

6

In those states that have capital

punishment, motivation influences the imposition of the
death sentence. For example, murdering for profit may
warrant the death penalty; in these cases, maintain
content neutrality is maintained because the punishment
is justified as deterrence, not as restriction of expression:
the profit motive could compel rational people to take
their chances and commit murder, and therefore deserves
more severe punishment.

In Lawrence's model, the

motivation of bias is not punished out of legislative
distaste for the content of the belief but rather because of
magnitude of the harm: it affects not only the immediate
victim but also his or her associates.

6

Ibid., Lawr nee, pg. 106-109. Furtherm r Lawrence b lieve that
the differ nc between rnotiv and int nt (intent is already
puni habl ) is t nu us with regard to puni ·hing Bia Crimes and
protecting fr
p ech and expr
ion.
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In Lawrence's model only harmful effects
influence the degree of punishment.

Expression and

speech are not punished. However, the increase in harm
stems from «singling-out» and "singling-out" is a direct
consequence of bias motivation. If this is the case, I do
not believe that the paradox is effectively avoided .
"Singling-out" is not a crime in and of itself; any
additional harm that Lawrence claims results from this
process cannot be separated from the thought of the
offender. One could easily claim that although
"singling-out" occurs, it is accidental; and, although it
may augment the degree of harm experienced by a
victim in a crime, it is not intended by the offender, is
not a criminal offense, and therefore is not punishable.
Lawrence's ideas about singling-out are
incomplete and do not explain clearly how the biased
motivation affects the harm in a Bias Crime. The idea of
singling-out lacks context and therefore cannot be
interpreted to warrant increased punishment.

What is

the missing context? Rather than refer to a two-tiered
theory for punishing Bias Crimes, I think it is easier and
constitutionally more effective to simply emphasize the
uniqueness of these crimes. Bias Crimes cause more
harm to victims and therefore, according to the premise
that punishment should fit the crime, warrant more
severe punishment. This harm~ connected with their
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motive and even the criminal's 'message' but in a way
that avoids the paradox.
I propose examining the illocutionaryforce of the
message sent through the biased motivation to commit a
crime. Examining illocutionary force allows us to see the
message as a threat which is punishable as such and not as
content. My theory is a kind of 'two-in-one' approach
because it treats Bias Crimes as essentially two crimes in
one.
We all recognize that it is illegal to scream «fire»
in a crowded area. It is possible to punish this expression
of speech however because speech - screaming in this case
- is an action, and actions can be punishable. All speech is
action to a degree but as long as a speech act does not
violate any law, it can be used to send any message
regardless of content.

J. L. Austin,

a pioneer in the field of philosophy

of language, coined the expression, illocutionaryforce, to
signify what one does in saying something. An example
will help illuminate this: 7 Imagine a bartender saying
"The bar will be closed in five minutes." The speech-act
can be broken down into the following components:
1) Act of locution: the bartender utters the

sentence that the bar will be closed in five
minutes.
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2) Act of illocution: the bartender is informing

the patrons that the bar soon will be dosing
and perhaps is also urging them to order a last
drink. The uptake of the illocutionary act
refers to how the patrons understand the
bartender's utterance.
3) Act of perlocution:

the bartender intends to

cause the patrons to believe that the bar will
shortly dose and maybe to prompt them to
order a final drink. The uptake of the
perlocutionary act is the reaction of the
patrons.
Let's apply this apparatus to a Bias Crime such a
an act of case of Gay-bashing. The content of the
locutionary act is "I hate gay people!" The illocutionary
force of this message is to threaten gay people with
random violence, roughly: "In doing this I urge others to
follow my example and incite them to assault Gay people
out of hatred." We can only hope there will be no
perlocutionary force so that the promptings will fall on
deaf ears. So, a threat can be construed from the
illocutionary force of the message alone.

Bias

criminals intend to threaten individual victims as well as
the group with which the individual is associated and Bias

7

Th e ampl
ome from Edward, Craig. Routledge
En y lopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9, Pg. 82, ( 1998).
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Crimes often serve to incite similar crimes. They have the
illocutionary force of threats. The force of threat is an
intrinsic part of the crime itself: the motivation to
threaten and the motivation to commit crime presuppose
one another.
Punishing Bias Crimes, then, is not punishing
thought, consequently, there are no implications for the
First Amendment. One is punishing the threat which is
an unacceptable form of expression of thought. Just as
public displays of nudity and drunkenness are not legal,
not because of the content of the beliefs expressed but
rather because of the form of expression. My approach
preserves the important right to express radical,
nonsensical, or even objectionable ideas.
I think the argument from illocutionary force
which foresees punishment for the threat in Bias Crimes
is less problematical than Lawrence's two-tiered system
which, with its incomplete notions of "singling-out" as
grounds for enhanced punishment, doesn't necessarily
avoid the paradox. My two-in-one theory for punishing
Bias Crimes avoids conflict with the First Amendment
while correctly construing the especial severity of these
crimes and the proportionality of enhanced punishment.

In conclusion, differential punishment for Bias
Crimes as a unique category of crime justifying a specific
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proportion between crime and punishment is both
advisable and constitutionally permissible.
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